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The French Opposition to the war in Iraq in early 2003, prompted calls for a boycott of French wine
in the US.  We measure the magnitude of consumers’ participation in the boycott, and look at basic
evidence of who participates.  Conservative estimates indicate that the boycott resulted in 26% lower
weekly sales at its peak, and 13% lower sales over the six month period that we estimate the boycott
lasted for.  These findings suggest that business should be concerned that their actions may provoke
a boycott which hurts their profits.  We also find that neither political preferences or media attention
are important determinants of boycott participation.
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Should businesses be concerned that their actions may provoke a consumer boycott which hurts
their proﬁts? Economists tend to be skeptical of the eﬀectiveness of boycotts because of a free-
rider problem. Individual consumers are glad for others to alter their purchase choices in support
of some cause, but realize their own participation is unlikely to make any diﬀerence and would
require some sacriﬁce. This intuition is reinforced by prior empirical studies into the eﬀect of
boycotts on ﬁrms’ stock prices, which typically ﬁnd small or insigniﬁcant eﬀects. Nevertheless,
purported boycotts are commonplace.1 Recent examples include KFC (for alleged mistreatment
of chickens), Nestl´ e (for marketing breast milk substitutes), Nike (for employment practices
in East Asia), and Target (for not using the words “Merry Christmas” in its advertising). In
this study we look at a direct measure of consumer participation in a boycott: the impact of a
boycott on weekly product-level sales. Speciﬁcally, we measure the eﬀect on sales of French wine
from the US consumer boycott of French wine in 2003. We ﬁnd a 13% decrease in sales over the
six months we estimate the boycott lasted for. Hence, this example indicates that businesses
should indeed be concerned about provoking a boycott of their products.
The French government did not support the US-led war in Iraq when it commenced on
March 20, 2003. While France was not alone in their opposition to the war, as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, France was the most prominent of the opposing
countries. Germany also opposed the war and was a temporary member of the security council
at the time. However, France was more outspoken and more lambasted in the US-press. The
ﬁrst indication in a major US newspaper of a consumer boycott of French wine occured in the
New York Times on February 14, 2003. Of course the French wine industry played no role in
the French government’s opposition to the Iraq war. For consumers supporting the boycott of
French wine, the hope is that somehow this may impact the behavior of the French government.
Friedman (1999) deﬁnes this kind of boycott as a surrogate boycott, in which the French wine
industry serves as a stand-in for the French government. Wine may not have been the only
industry to experience a boycott of French products. Aside from boycotts, there were also other
ways that people in America displayed their unhappiness with the French government, including
attempts to rename french fries as freedom fries.
1John and Klein (2003) argue that around 40% of Fortune 50 companies may be subject to a boycott at any
one time, and they note survey evidence indicating that 18% of Americans participate in boycotts.
1In 2002, the year before the Iraq war, imports of French table wine accounted for 2.7% of
the total volume of wine purchased in the U.S.2 News reports describing the boycott of French
wine in 2003 have provided conﬂicting indications as to whether there was any actual impact
on French wine sales. Regardless, there are a couple of reasons to expect a non-trivial degree of
consumer participation in the boycott. Firstly, there are numerous substitutes for French wine,
and for at least some French wine, there are close substitutes from other countries. Hence, the
sacriﬁce a consumer incurs by altering their purchase decision is likely to be minor. Secondly, the
discontent towards France because of their opposition has been quite dramatic in the US. Gallup
polls indicate that in May 2000, 50% of Americans considered France to be an ally and only
4% considered France to be unfriendly. However, in April 2003, 18% of Americans considered
France to be an ally and 31% considered France to be unfriendly.
We obtained data for the period December 2001 to November 2003, in which we observe
weekly price and quantity, by product and by city, for wine sales in mass-merchandise stores. The
data cover four geographic markets in the US: Boston, Houston, Los Angeles and San Diego. We
selected these cities because they have relatively high wine consumption per person, and because
there is variation in political preferences—Boston and Los Angeles are Democrat-dominated
regions, while Houston and San Diego are Republican-dominated regions. Importantly, for each
wine product the data includes the country-of-origin. We identify the timing of the consumer
boycott of French wine based on articles in leading national newspapers. Complete details of
the data are provided in Section 2.
We focus on three main questions about consumer boycotts. First, how large was the eﬀect
of the boycott on French wine sales? Second, who participated in the boycott? Third, what
impact did diﬀerent types of media have on the magnitude of the boycott?
Our conservative estimate is that the boycott caused a 13% decrease in the volume of French
wine sold over the ﬁrst six months after the US war with Iraq commenced. In the conclusion we
describe a back-of-the-envelope calculation indicating that total imports of French wine to the
entire U.S. were lowered by $112 million because of the boycott. The strength of the boycott
varies from week to week. We estimate the peak of the boycott occurred nine weeks after the
ﬁrst news reports of the boycott, with an estimated 26% lower volume of French wine sold,
2Adams Wine Handbook 2003, p. 43. The revenue share of French wine would be signiﬁcantly higher than
2.7% for 2002, due to the relatively high average price of French wine.
2than if there had been no boycott. The strength of the boycott fades over time. Our estimates
indicate that around six months after the boycott started, French wine sales are back to within
5% of where they would have been if there was no boycott. By the end of our sample, which
is eight months after the war commenced, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact from the boycott on
weekly French wine sales.
Our ﬁnding that there is a signiﬁcant degree of consumer participation in the boycott is
at odds with the prediction of the simple free-rider theory. This is analogous to voting where
economists also predict free-riding will lead to zero voter turnout, which is clearly wrong. The
theory may be a straw-man that imposes unrealistic assumptions about individual rationality
and self-interest. Nevertheless, the challenge is to better understand what drives individuals’
participation decisions.
We examine three potential determinants of boycott participation. First, whether political
preferences aﬀect participation. The variation in Presidential voting across cities allows us to
examine this aspect. We ﬁnd the highest degree of participation in San Diego (Republican)
followed by Los Angeles (Democratic) then Houston (Republican).3 Hence, the data indicates
that participation is not closely aligned with political preferences. Second, whether willingness-
to-pay for the boycott product aﬀects participation. To do so, we estimate the impact of the
boycott by French wine price-quartile. We ﬁnd that cheap and expensive French wine are the
most aﬀected, while moderately-priced French wine is the least impacted. We conjecture that
cheap wine buyers may have mild preferences for speciﬁc wines, and buyers of expensive French
wine tend to give the wine to others as a gift. Hence, these buyers incur little disutility from
substituting to wines from other regions. While buyers of moderately-priced wine have stronger
preferences for French wine and intend consuming it themselves.
A third potential determinant of boycott participation that we consider is the role of the
media. We focus on the importance of front-page coverage, and the outspoken support for
the boycott by news media personality Bill O’Reilly of the O’Reilly Factor on Fox News. Our
estimates suggest that front page news is no more impactful than non-front page news, and that
Bill O’Reilly did not aﬀect the magnitude of the boycott. Our prior belief was that political
preferences and media attention would signiﬁcantly aﬀect boycott participation. Apparently the
reason why people choose to participate in boycotts is more subtle.
3As we explain in Section 4 the data for Boston is unreliable.
3Several prior papers analyze the impact of boycotts on the stock prices of target compa-
nies.4 Some ﬁnd negative eﬀects on stock prices: Friedman (1985), Pruitt and Friedman (1986),
Pruitt, Wei and White (1988) and Davidson, Worrell and El-Jelly (1995). Other studies ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant eﬀect, or even positive eﬀects: Koku, Akhigbe and Springer (1997) and Teoh, Welch
and Wazzan (1999). The most recent paper of this kind, Epstein and Schnietz (2002), ﬁnds
mixed evidence. We are aware of one previous study examining sales data for evidence of an
eﬀective boycott. Bentzen and Smith (2002) study aggregate monthly sales of French wine in
Norway around the time of French nuclear testing in 1995-96, which prompted calls to boycott
French products. Their analysis suggests there may have been a slight decrease in sales near
the time of the nuclear tests, but does not quantify the eﬀect or provide any statistical test of
the claim. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to examine product-level data for
evidence of boycott participation.5
In Section 2 we summarize the data. Section 3 contains our analysis of the eﬀect of the
boycott on aggregate French wine sales (i.e., quantity). In Section 4 we examine who participates
in the boycott. The role of the media is analyzed in Section 5 and Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 Data Summary
There are two main components to our dataset: wine sales data and newspaper coverage of the
French wine boycott. The sales data comes from Information Resources Inc (IRI) and is scanner
data from supermarkets and other general merchandize stores. A limitation is that the data
does not include sales at specialty wine stores or restaurants.6 However, a strength of the data
is that it is weekly observations at the product level on a city-by-city basis, for the two year
period of December 2001 to November 2003. Importantly, the data also identiﬁes the country
of origin of each wine product (or state if from the U.S.).7 All of the analysis in this study is
4A number of papers provide theoretical analyses of boycotts. See, for example: Baron (2003) and John and
Klein (2003).
5Fershtman and Gandal (1998) use product-level data to measure the impact of the Arab boycott on Israel on
consumer and producer welfare in the Israeli automobile market. In this case, Arab nations eﬀectively stopped
Japanese car manufacturers from selling products to Isreal. Consumer participation in the boycott was not an
issue in that case.
6Oﬀ-premise sales of wine in 2002 for the entire U.S. accounted for 78.7% of all wine sales, by volume. See
Adams Wine Handbook 2003, p. 30.
7We also observe the volume, name and type of wine for each product.
4based on sales of 750ml bottles. The expense of the data limited us to obtaining it for four cities.
We selected cities that vary in political preferences: Boston and Los Angeles are Democratic
strongholds, and Houston and San Diego are Republican strongholds.
Table 1 summarizes the sales data based on the country or state of origin. There are 6,781
unique wines in the dataset, and 14,175 wine-city pairs. For these four cities, total wine sales
(of 750ml bottles) over the two year period is over $1 billion. Total wine sales for the entire U.S.
in 2002 alone were about $20.5 billion.8 Californian wines dominate our sample, with a 78.2%
share of revenue. Wines from Italy are the second most common in the data, accounting for
6.3% of total revenue. French wines are equal third in revenue share with Australia (4% revenue
shares for both). However, the average price of French wine is much higher than wines from
any other region, making French wine the 5th most popular on the basis of unit shares, in these
cities.
In Table 2 we compare the four cities in our data. French wine is relatively more popular
in Boston with a 5% unit share, and the least popular in Los Angeles and San Diego. The
two Californian cities exhibit a strong preference for wines from California. We had anticipated
this when choosing the four cities, which is why we decided on two cities both from southern
California with diﬀering political preferences. We also report the average number of 750ml units
per person in each of the cities. This measure varies considerably across the cities, from 0.44
in Boston to 8.73 in San Diego. Rather than revealing true diﬀerences in wine consumption,
we take this as evidence that IRI’s coverage of wine selling retailers is relatively poor in Boston
and Houston, compared to Los Angeles and San Diego. This limitation of the data may impact
our analysis. We assume the data is equally representative across the four cities, allowing us to
make comparisons in the eﬀectiveness of the boycott across cities. In Table 2 we also report the
percent of votes for Bush (Republican) and Gore (Democrat) in the 2000 presidential election in
each of the cities. It is apparent that Boston is strongly democratic, Los Angeles is democratic,
San Diego is republican and Houston is strongly republican.
There is a question as to how to determine when the boycott is active or being called for.
We implement two approaches in the analysis below. First, we deﬁne a French boycott dummy
8Adams Wine Handbook 2003, p. 8. The ﬁgure for total US sales includes table wine, wine coolers, champagne
and sparkling wines, dessert and fortiﬁed wines, and vermouth/aperitifs. Table wine accounts for 90% of the
aggregate, by volume. The total ﬁgure also covers wine in sizes other than 750ml bottles.
5equal to one during the ﬁrst eight weeks after the war commenced on March 20, 2003.9 This
allows us to estimate straightforward diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcations as a basic indication
of the eﬀectiveness of the boycott. However, this approach ignores variation in the intensity of
the boycott, and requires somewhat ad-hoc assumptions about when the boycott started and
ended.
We therefore utilize a second approach based on newspaper reports that mention the words
“France” or “French” in the headline and “boycott” in the text as a proxy for when the boycott
is taking place. This has the appeal that we rely on a data source for determining when the
boycott is active, as opposed to our judgement. Furthermore, the number of news articles in
a given week is a measure of the intensity of the call for a boycott. We count articles in the
leading national papers: New York Times, Wall Street Journal and USA Today. In addition, a
high-proﬁle proponent of the boycott was Bill O’Reilly on the Fox News channel. For some of
the analysis we examine the separate eﬀect of Bill O’Reilly, based on a count of the number of
times he discussed the boycott each week.
For most of the analysis in this study we interpret the news variables as proxying the call for
a boycott of French wine. Our primary goal is to assess the degree of consumer participation in
the boycott, not whether the newspapers themselves had a causal impact on the boycott. Our
interpretation is that the actual call for the boycott comes from a variety of sources, including
politicians, media celebrities (such as Rush Limbaugh in addition to Bill O’Reilly) and other
prominent individuals (such as Hollywood publicist Michael Levine). However, in reality the
news coverage may be crucial for stimulating consumer participation, and so there may be some
causal impact from the newspapers on the eﬀectiveness of the boycott. Hence, in some portions
of our analysis, as explained below, we explore the role of the media by separating the impact
of front page news articles from non-front page articles.
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the news reports for the boycott. During the period
of our data there were a total of 22 articles about the boycott in these three newspapers. Nine
of these articles were on a front page. Bill O’Reilly discussed the boycott in 24 shows. Of the
three newspapers, the New York Times had the most articles and the Wall Street Journal had
the fewest. In the bottom panel of Table 3 we report the correlations of the various sources.
It is comforting that all are positively correlated, which suggests the news articles may be a
9In fact the data is weekly, so this boycott period is deﬁned as March 17, 2003 to May 11, 2003.
6reasonable proxy for the boycott.
To better illustrate the data, in Figure 1 we plot weekly market shares for wines by country-
of-origin, over the two year sample period, for the four cities in our dataset. We also include
vertical bars (units on the right-side vertical axis) showing the weeks with newspaper reports
of the boycott. We show the market shares for a set of four comparable countries—Australia,
France, Italy and Spain. The diagram emphasizes the point that we observe sales for more than
a year before the boycott, allowing us to identify underlying trends in sales for wines from each
region. For example, it is clear from the ﬁrst year of our data that Australian wine sales have
a strong increasing trend. Also, while hardly conclusive, it is apparent that the French wine
share falls at the time of the news reports about the French wine boycott. This is suggestive
that there was some degree of participation in the boycott.
3 Eﬀect of Boycott on French Wine Sales
In this section we measure the eﬀect of the boycott on French wine sales. In the ﬁrst subsection
we estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation using weekly-product level observations for
wines from all regions. In the second subsection we estimate a nonlinear model that allows us
to measure the week-to-week variation in the strength of the boycott. The third subsection
contains a robustness check where we estimate the eﬀect of the boycott on wines from countries
other than France. In subsequent sections we explore the mechanism of the boycott.
3.1 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis
We begin our analysis of the eﬀect of the boycott on French wine sales by examining the most
basic evidence. In Figure 2 we show the percent change in the quantity of French wine sold
each month in the second year of the data (November 2002 to October 2003) compared to the
same month in the ﬁrst year of the data. This is a simple way of controlling for seasonality.10
We also show the percent changes for wines from a selection of other regions, which provide
useful comparisons. Importantly, the ﬁgure includes a vertical line showing the time of the ﬁrst
10This also allows for the possibility that the seasonality in sales is diﬀerent for wines from each region.
7newspaper article mentioning the boycott. The ﬁgure is a graphical analog to the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence speciﬁcation we estimate below.
Figure 2 shows that French wine sales were lower in each month from November 2002 to
September 2003 than compared to the same month a year before. This indicates that French
wine sales were declining even before the boycott. In the ﬁnal month of our sample period,
October 2003, French wine sales are higher than one year before. Over the same period, wines
from California, Italy and Spain have ﬂuctuated between higher and lower sales than one year
before. Australian wines are an exception, showing higher sales in every month, and sometimes
to a dramatic degree—sales are more than 60% higher than a year before in three of the twelve
months.
Focusing on the French wine time-series in Figure 2, the curve exhibits a mild u-shape. In
particular, the change in French wine sales is the most negative during the three months after
the start of the boycott. This suggests the boycott may have had a negative impact on French
wine sales. However, sales of Californian, Italian and Spanish wines also drop markedly in March
2003, casting doubt on this interpretation. Overall, Figure 2 provides weak evidence, at best, of
the boycott’s impact.
A straightforward method for estimating the impact of the boycott on French wine sales is
to implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. Let Qijkt equal the quantity sold of wine i,
in city j, originating from region k, in week t. We deﬁne the variable Boycottkt as a dummy
variable equal to one for French wine during the two-month period March 17, 2003 to May 11,
2003 (the ﬁrst eight weeks after the war commenced). We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Qijkt) = αij + τt + θBoycottkt + ijkt,
where αij are ﬁxed-eﬀects for each wine-city pair, τt are week ﬁxed eﬀects, θ is the coeﬃcient of
interest, and  is the residual.
The inclusion of wine-city ﬁxed-eﬀects assures that identiﬁcation of the boycott coeﬃcient
is based on within-wine-within-city variation in relative sales of French wine. The weekly time
dummies τt control for general seasonality in wine sales. However, there may still be diﬀerences
in seasonality for wines from diﬀerent regions. To help limit any bias in the estimate of θ from
idiosyncratic seasonality in French wine, we ﬁrst estimate the above speciﬁcation using data for
8the two months the boycott variable is switched on, combined with the same period of time
one year before. Hence, identiﬁcation of θ is limited to variation in the relative sales of French
wine during the same two month period one year beforehand, where it is plausible that seasonal
demand for French wine relative to wines from other regions is constant. This is a sample of
226,800 wine-city-week observations. The estimate for θ is reported in ﬁrst row of Table 4. With
this speciﬁcation, we estimate that the boycott caused an 8.8% decrease in French wine sales
(signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 99% conﬁdence).
Table 4 contains the results for an array of alternative speciﬁcations—each row is a separate
regression. The main point to presenting these alternatives is to show that the negative eﬀect
of the boycott on French wine sales appears to be robust. Although the precise magnitude
is variable. We now discuss each of the alternative speciﬁcations. For all the estimates in
Table 4 we report robust standard errors. In every case, the estimate of the boycott coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 99% conﬁdence.
A concern may be that the estimate of the boycott eﬀect in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation is due to
stocking decisions of the retailers (or distributors) rather than consumers’ choices. To address
this, in the second speciﬁcation we limit the sample to wine-city pairs for which we observe
strictly positive sales in every week during the same four months as the ﬁrst speciﬁcation. We
presume that these wines are always available for consumers, and hence any variation in sales is
due to consumers’ choices. This reduces the sample to 107,821 observations. As reported in the
second row of Table 4, the estimate for the eﬀect of the boycott is now larger—a 12.1% decrease
in French wine sales.
We seek to interpret the estimate of the boycott coeﬃcient as a demand response. However,
if prices of French wines increased at the time of the boycott, this may also explain the reduction
in French wine sales. Moreover, we could not rule out the possibility that prices of French wines
are raised in response to the boycott, because high elasticity consumers may be more likely to
participate in the boycott than low elasticity consumers. In the third speciﬁcation we include
the log of price on the right-hand side. Although not reported in the table, the estimated
coeﬃcient on ln(Price) is -1.20 (standard error of .03). In this case the estimate for the boycott
coeﬃcient implies a 7.8% decrease in French wine sales. The negative coeﬃcient on price, and
the reduction in magnitude of the boycott eﬀect relative to the second speciﬁcation, indicate
that relative prices of French wine may indeed have risen at the time of the boycott. This is
9veriﬁed in the fourth speciﬁcation where ln(Price) is the dependent variable in a speciﬁcation
that is equaivalent to the second row in Table 4. We estimate that the boycott caused a 1.1%
increase in the price of French wine relative to wines from other regions.
While a price increase in response to the boycott is not out of the question, one would
typically expect a reduction in demand to result in lower prices. Also, during the period of
our data, the US dollar has been depreciating relative to the Euro which could explain rising
U.S.-dollar prices of French wine. We therefore suspect that the estimate of the positive eﬀect
of the boycott on price may be spurious. To examine this possibility, in rows (5), (6) and (7)
in Table 4, we report the results from re-estimating the prior speciﬁcations using only data on
wines from European countries, for which the exchange rate eﬀect is neutral. In this case we ﬁnd
eﬀect of the boycott on prices is negligible (less than one percent decrease in relative price of
French wine). The estimate for the impact of the boycott on French wine sales is now estimated
to be around 16%.
Finally, a weakness of the above speciﬁcations is the absence of separate time-trends for
wines from each region. If French wine sales have been trending down relative to sales of wines
from other regions, as Figure 2 indicates, the above estimates will overstate the impact of the
boycott. To address this concern, we use the full dataset, not just the four month samples used
above, to estimate the following speciﬁcation:




β1kt + β2kt2 + β3kt3

+ θBoycottkt + ijkt,
which includes origin-speciﬁc time trends (up to a cubic). The estimate for θ is reported in the
ﬁnal row of Table 4. In this case we ﬁnd a 5.1% decrease in French wine sales due to the boycott.
3.2 Analysis of Weekly Boycott Intensity
The above diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis indicates the boycott caused a decrease in French
wine sales by an amount somewhere between 5.1% and 16.6%. To better gauge the magnitude
of the eﬀect we estimate a speciﬁcation that allows the intensity of the boycott to vary from
week to week. Also, rather than assume the boycott lasted for two months, as we did in the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation, this approach yields an estimate of how long the boycott
lasted.
10Let Qkt be the quantity of wine from region k purchased in week t (aggregated across all





α0k + α1kt + α2kt2 + α3kt3

+ τt + βHkt + θNkt + kt, (1)
where
Nkt = IF
k (nt + δNk,t−1). (2)
The variable nt is the number of news articles in week t (in the New York Times, Wall Street
Journal and USA Today) with the words “France” or “French” in the headline and “boycott”
in the text. IF
k is an indicator variable equal to one for France and zero otherwise. Hence, Nkt
measures the intensity of the boycott—it is the depreciated stock of boycott news articles. The
model also includes region ﬁxed-eﬀects (α0k), region-speciﬁc time trends and week ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Also, because empirically French wine is particularly popular on certain holidays, we include a
holiday dummy Hkt which equals one for French wine in weeks with a major holiday.11
There are two key parameters of interest. Firstly, δ measures the rate of depreciation of
participation in the boycott. If δ = 0, calls for a boycott last week have no impact on boycott
activity this week. We expect that 0 < δ < 1.12 The closer that δ is to one, the longer the
boycott lasts. Secondly, θ measures the contemporaneous response of consumers to current calls
for boycotting French wine. The more consumers that participate in the boycott, the more
negative will be θ. With estimates of δ and θ in hand, and data on news articles (nt), we can
compute the variable impact of the boycott in each week. We estimate the model via nonlinear
least squares.
The results are reported in Table 5, including estimates for diﬀering sub-samples and vari-
ations on the above speciﬁcation. The top row of Table 5 is based on the full sample (4,160
observations). We obtain very precise estimates of both δ and θ: ˆ δ = 0.86 and ˆ θ = −0.02. Based
on the high R2 values shown in the table, we conclude that the model provides a good ﬁt to
the data. A potential concern with this analysis is serial correlation in the dependent variable.
However, we compute a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.95 for French wine, indicating the absence
of any signiﬁcant serial correlation. Also, in Figure 3 we show actual and predicted sales of
French wine, where it is apparent that we provide close predictions in almost all periods. The
ﬁgure also includes counterfactual sales, which we explain below.
11The speciﬁc holidays are Valentine’s Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Years.
12This is not a constraint imposed for estimation.
11The estimates themselves are not very intuitive measures of the boycott’s magnitude. Hence,
we compute three other measures of the implied magnitude of the boycott, as shown in the last
three columns of the table. In each case, we compare predicted sales of French wine given the
boycott, with the predicted sales if there was no boycott. To compute the counterfactual we set
nt = 0 in all periods, and compute predicted quantities based on the estimated parameters. The
time-series of the counterfactual is shown in Figure 3, where the counterfactual shows higher
sales from around February to July, 2003.
Comparing factual and counterfactual sales in each week, the ﬁrst of the three measures
is the maximum weekly eﬀect. We ﬁnd that, at the peak of the boycott, weekly French wine
sales would have been 26.6% higher if there was no boycott. A second measure of the boycott’s
magnitude is the percent of lost sales over the six months following the start of the boycott
(February 10, 2003 to August 17, 2003). Again, the calculation is based on the counterfactual
described above. For the base speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that French wine sales were 13.3% lower
than what they would have been if there was no boycott, over this six month period. A third
measure of the boycott’s magnitude is the estimated duration, deﬁned as the number of months
until French wine sales return to within 5% of what they would have been if there was no
boycott. In the top row of Table 5 we report the estimated duration to be 5.7 months, for the
base speciﬁcation.13
Figure 4 graphically depicts the estimated weekly variation in boycott intensity, based on the
counterfactual described above. We also include vertical bars showing the timing and quantity
of news articles referring to the boycott. The time path of the boycott magnitude reﬂects the
instantaneous responses to boycott calls, followed by periods of depreciation in the degree of
participation. While the magnitude is above 25% at only one point, there are 18 consecutive
weeks where the reduction in sales due to the boycott exceeds 10%.
The estimates reported in the remaining three rows of Table 5 serve as robustness checks. By
almost any measure, the alternative speciﬁcations we consider give rise to larger boycott eﬀects.
In the second row, we include ln(Price) as an independent variable. Since an observation is
the aggregate quantity of wine for a given region-of-origin in a given week, price is deﬁned as
the weighted average price. We now only include wines with positive sales in a given week, and
so the number of observations falls to 2,808. As shown in Table 5, we ﬁnd a larger maximum
13Note the dataset extends about 9 months after the start of the boycott.
12weekly eﬀect of the boycott (now 39.8% versus 26.6% under the base model). The six month
eﬀect and duration are also larger than the base model.
As discussed above in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis, it may be reasonable to limit the
sample to only European wines. In the third row of Table 5 we report the results of using
this sample for the nonlinear model. The implied magnitudes are quite similar to the base
model. Finally, we estimate the nonlinear model using only the data for French wine, so that
identiﬁcation comes entirely from the time-series of French wine sales. With two years of weekly
data, this implies 104 observations. As shown in Table 5, the estimates for θ and δ are still very
precise. The three measures for the magnitude of the boycott in this case indicate the largest of
all—maximum weekly eﬀect of 45%, 26% lower sales over six months, and the boycott duration
of 8.5 months.
Hence, the estimates for the above nonlinear speciﬁcation suggest a conservative estimate
is that the French wine boycott lasted around 6 months, during which time French wine sales
were approximately 13% lower, and at the peak of the boycott weekly sales were down by about
26%.
3.3 Eﬀect of Boycott on Sales of Non-French Wines
We expect the boycott of French wine causes some degree of substition to wines from other
countries. Hence, it would provide veriﬁcation of the boycott eﬀect if we found the boycott
caused an increase in sales of wines from other regions. This also serves as a speciﬁcation check.
If we ﬁnd that the boycott causes lower sales of wines from other regions, this would suggest
our empirical analysis does a poor job of separating the eﬀects of the boycott from underlying
time-trends.
In Table 6 we present results for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model as well as the nonlinear
model, in which we estimate the eﬀect of the French wine boycott on sales of wines from other
regions. Each row contains the results from two diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the top row we
restate the results for the eﬀect of the boycott on French wine sales as a comparison.
Looking at the impact on Australian wine sales, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model indicates
133.8% higher sales due to the boycott. This seems reasonable in comparison to the estimated
12.1% decrease in French wine sales, based on the same model. Recall, for the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence model we consider the eﬀect of the boycott over a two month period. The nonlinear
model indicates 12.1% higher sales over the six months following the start of the boycott. This
is probably too high—some of the high growth in Australian wine sales may be incorrectly
attributed to the boycott.
For sales of Californian wine we obtain unrealistic results under both speciﬁcations. First,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model indicates the boycott caused lower sales of Californian wine.
In contrast, the nonlinear model implies almost 19% increases in sales of Californian wine. Given
the large market share of Californian wine, the estimated increase is many times larger than the
decrease in sales of French wine. These results cast doubt on our analysis more generally. The
fact that Californian wines are so dominant in the US, with around 80% market share, suggests
it may be unreasonable to compare sales of French wine with sales of Californian wine.
The results for wines from Chile and Italy are more encouraging. The signs are magnitudes
are reasonable under both models. Since Chile has a smaller market share than France, the six
month estimate of 13.4% increased sales is not implausible. Finally, the results for Spain are
mixed. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate is reasonable, but the nonlinear model implies an
implausible eﬀect, as shown in the bottom row of Table 6. On the one hand, the results shown
in Table 6 provide mixed evidence as to how convincing our estimates are of the impact of the
boycott on French wine sales. On the other hand, these results do suggest that wines from
Australia, Chile and Italy have beneﬁtted from the French wine boycott.
Finally, in an unreported regression, we estimate the eﬀect of the boycott on sales of Cal-
ifornian wines with French-sounding names, such as the winery Chateau Julien. We found no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on sales for these wines. This could be due to consumers’ ability to recognize
such wines as being non-French, or because stores tend to shelve wines by country-of-origin
which helps consumers avoid confusion.
144 Who Participates in the Boycott?
Who participated in the French wine boycott? We consider two characteristics of potential par-
ticipants. Firstly, are Republican supporters more likely to boycott French wine than Democrat
supporters? Gallup polling suggests that Republicans may be more likely to boycott French
wine: in February 2004, 64% of Republicans and 37% of Democrats held an unfavorable opinion
towards France.14 The second characteristic we consider is whether buyers of cheap or expensive
French wine more likely to participate in the boycott.
We do not observe consumer-level decisions on whether to boycott French wine. However, we
observe product-level sales for each geographic market, varying in aggregate political preferences.
Hence, we estimate the eﬀect of the boycott by price-quartile, and we estimate the eﬀect of the
boycott separately for each of the four cities in our dataset.
We start by analyzing the variation in the boycott eﬀect by political preferences. Figure 5
shows the time-series of the market share for French wine in each city. As noted above, Boston
and Los Angeles are pro-Democrat markets, and Houston and San Diego are pro-Republican
markets. The ﬁgure reveals that the data for Boston provides a very diﬀerent pattern of sales
than for the other three markets. The increase in market share for French wine in Boston in
2003 may be due to a reverse-boycott eﬀect in Boston, sometimes referred to as buycott, or may
simply be due to a problem with the data. Since the increase in Boston begins a couple of
months ahead of the boycott, it seems much more likely to indicate a substantive mid-sample
change in IRI’s data collection in Boston, than anything related to the boycott. Hence, while
we present the estimates for Boston, these results should not be taken seriously.15
For the remaining three cities in Figure 5, we see the now familiar pattern of lower market
shares for French wine corresponding to the boycott news articles. Los Angeles and San Diego
oﬀer a nice comparison, since the time-series are very similar for both. It also appears that the
boycott was longer lasting in Los Angeles than in San Diego. To quantify the boycott eﬀect for
each market, we separately estimate the nonlinear model shown in equations (1) and (2) for each
14By comparison, in February 2002, prior to the war in Iraq, 15% of Repulicans and 16% of Democrats held
unfavorable views of France. See “Image of France Begins to Recover in American Eyes”, The Gallup Organization,
February 18, 2004.
15Also, please note that we re-estimated all the previous results in the paper with the data for Boston excluded,
and found no qualitative diﬀerences in any of the ﬁndings.
15city. The results are presented in Table 7. All coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero with 99% conﬁdence.
We focus on the implied measures of the boycott magnitude and ignore the results for Boston.
As shown in the table, the estimates imply San Diego has the largest maximum weekly eﬀect
and the largest 6-month eﬀect of the boycott. Both of these measures show that Los Angeles has
the second largest eﬀects, and Houston is third. The ranking is reversed based on the duration
measure, which may be right, or else suggests our method is poor at separately identifying the
θ and δ coeﬃcients. Of the three measures, the 6-month eﬀect is arguably the most relevant,
because it reﬂects a combination of the intensity and duration of the boycott.
On face value, our estimates suggest the boycott was most eﬀective in San Diego, followed
by Los Angeles. Hence, it does not appear that boycott participation is closely aligned with
political preferences. The reason why the boycott was strongest in San Diego may be due to the
strong military presence (Navy and Marines) in the area, but this is speculation.
We now examine the eﬀectiveness of the boycott for wines in diﬀerent price categories. Was
participation in the boycott greater for the buyers of cheap or expensive French wine? Figure 6
shows the time-series of the market share of French wine in each quartile of the distribution of
French wine prices. Note that the average price of French wine is well above that of wines from
other regions. Hence, in the top price quartile (prices above $25.76) French wines dominate the
market, with around 40% share in that category. To make the ﬁgure more readable, we divide
the share of French wine in the top price quartile by a factor of 10.
In the ﬁgure, the French wine share in the lowest price quartile (prices below $7.98) noticeably
falls at the time of the boycott. In the top price quartile there is distinct downward spike in
market share of French wine during the boycott, although it appears to be transitory. For the
middle quartiles, the time-series reveal no obvious evidence of boycott eﬀects.
To quantify the eﬀects of the boycott, we again re-estimate the nonlinear model given by
equations (1) and (2) separately for each price quartile (aggregating across cities). The results
are presented in Table 8. All coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with 99%
conﬁdence. As Figure 6 indicated, the boycott of expensive French wines was intense but short-
lived. We compute a maximum weekly eﬀect of 52% lower sales, but a 6-month eﬀect of only a
1612.4% decrease. It is noteworthy that the impact on expensive wines was large but short-lived,
and it is an appealing feature of our speciﬁcation that we are able to separately identify these
two dimensions of boycott participation.
Cheap French wine, on the other hand, has a maximum weekly loss of 73.8% and a 6-month
loss of 34.4%. The impact on medium-to-low priced French wine (priced between roughly $8
and $12) is similar to the cheap wines, but not quite as severe. The medium-to-expensive French
wines (around $12 to $26) are the least impacted, and in fact our estimates imply the boycott
caused small increase in sales for these wines.
We can speculate on the explanation for why the strength of the boycott diﬀers across price
categories in this way. The reason why expensive French wine has a big impact from the boycott
may be because people are more likely to give such wine as gifts (relative to other wine).16 The
reasoning is that the buyer of the wine does not intend to consume it themselves, so there is
little disutility from substituting to wine from another region. Also, the gift-giver may feel a
desire to show the gift-receiver that they are participating in the boycott.
The reason why cheap French wine has a big impact from the boycott may be because
consumers of cheap wine tend to be indiﬀerent between diﬀerent wines, which is why they
consume cheap wine. Again, for these consumers the disutility from substituting to wine from
another region may be low. Conversely, the buyers of moderately-priced French wine are a group
of consumers that may have more reﬁned tastes for wines, and they purchase this wine for their
own consumption rather than as gifts. Hence, these consumers are the least likely to be willing
to switch to wines from another region. Of course these explanations are entirely speculative.
To summarize the results of this section, we ﬁnd that: (i) participation in the French wine
boycott does not seem to be related to political preferencs; and (ii) buyers of cheap French
wine and expensive French wine seem to be the most likely to participate in the boycott, with
medium-priced French wines the least impacted.
16In Figure 6, high price French wine is the only category to display a dramatic spike in sales in the holiday
period.
175 Role of the Media
The above ﬁndings show that there was an economically signiﬁcant degree of participation in the
French wine boycott. Thus, skepticism that people would not participate due to the free-riding
problem appears to be unfounded. But can we generalize from these results to other boycotts?
Two features of the French wine boycott may heighten consumers’ participation beyond what
we may expect in other examples. Firstly, the availability of close substitutes. Although this is
certainly not unique to wine. Secondly, the French wine boycott received a fair amount of media
attention. In this section, we attempt to shed light on the role of the media in stimulating
participation in the French wine boycott. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether front page news
reports have a bigger impact on the boycott than non-front page articles. Also, since Bill
O’Reilly of the O’Reilly Factor on Fox News has been a high-proﬁle proponent of the boycott,
we examine whether his comments on the boycott have increased participation.
To test the hyptheses that front page news coverage is an important determinant of boycott
participation, or that advocacy by a prominent media personality such as Bill O’Reilly is im-
portant for stimulating participation, we re-estimate the nonlinear model given in equations (1)
and (2) with diﬀerent coeﬃcients for each media source. It is important to highlight the change
in assumptions we now make. Previously, we assumed that news reports about the boycott
are a proxy for the underlying calls for a boycott. Hence, we interpreted the estimated eﬀects
as simply measuring consumer participation, rather than the causal eﬀect of news reports on
participation. In contrast, in this section we seek to identify the causal impact of diﬀerent news
sources on boycott participation. To do so, we separately include multiple news sources in the
speciﬁcation, and test the distinct eﬀects of each. In doing so, we estimate which particular
news source is most highly correlated with participation in the boycott.
This empirical strategy is more compelling for identifying the causal eﬀect of Bill O’Reilly
than the eﬀect of front page news. The reason is because news coverage of the boycott is more
likely to be on the front page when the underlying call for the boycott is strongest. We therefore
expect that front page news appears to have bigger impact than non-front page news, even if
there is no causal eﬀect. However, it is conceivable that the tendency of Bill O’Reilly to discuss
the boycott on any given day is random. Indeed, we note that during the 6-month period of May
2005 to October 2005, long after the boycott started, Bill O’Reilly has continued to mention the
18French boycott on at least 9 occasions.
Table 9 reports the estimates for four versions of the nonlinear model with multiple news
sources. The ﬁrst column of estimates is for the base model previously discussed, to provide a
comparison. The second column of estimates is for a model that includes only the weekly count
of shows in which Bill O’Reilly mentions the boycott. Recall, the estimate for θ captures the
instantaneous impact and the estimate for δ captures the longevity of the eﬀect. The signiﬁcance
and size of the second column of estimates suggests Bill O’Reilly may have been an important
determinant of boycott activity.
However, when newspaper articles and the O’Reilly mentions are separately included, as
shown in the third column of estimates in Table 9, it does not appear that Bill O’Reilly stim-
ulated participation in the boycott.17 Indeed, the estimate of the instantaneous impact of Bill
O’Reilly is for an increase in sales of French wine. Perhaps Bill O’Reilly stirs a backlash against
the boycott. Regardless, it does not appear that his advocacy was an important driver of
participation.
In the ﬁnal column of estimates in Table 9 we examine the separate eﬀects of front page and
non-front page news. As we discussed, there is good reason to doubt that we have identiﬁed
the causal eﬀects of these news sources. Nevertheless, the estimates suggest that both types of
news articles have about the same eﬀects, both in terms of the instantaneous eﬀect (ˆ θ) and the
longevity (ˆ δ). On face value, this may imply that front page news coverage is not particularly
important for promoting boycott participation.
17Recall, in Table 3 we report the correlations between news coverage of the boycott from diﬀerent sources,
including Bill O’Reilly. The correlation between O’Reilly and the various newspapers is positive but never greater
than 0.5.
196 Conclusion
By examining weekly product-level sales data, we ﬁnd that there was economically signiﬁcant
consumer participation in the boycott of French wine in 2003 in the United States. Alternative
speciﬁcations, as well as the use of various subsamples, all indicate a non-trivial degree of
boycott participation. However, the precise magnitude of the eﬀect is less clear. Our preferred
speciﬁcation, the so-called nonlinear model, has the appeal that it relies on news articles for
determining when the boycott is active, and allows us to separately identify the intensity and
longevity of consumers’ participation. With this model, we conservatively estimate that, at the
peak of the boycott, the quantity of French wine sold would have been 26% higher if there was
no boycott. Also, over the six month period that we estimate the boycott lasted for, sales would
have been 13% higher. But some estimates indicate a maximum weekly eﬀect of more than 40%
forgone sales, and 20% lost sales over six months.
How large is the absolute value of lost revenue? To calculate this, we compute the mean
price of French wine conditional on each quartile of the distribution of French wine prices, then
multiply by the estimate for total quantity of French wine sold in each price quartile over the
six month period of the boycott, and sum together. This procedure gives the prediction for
French wine revenue of $7.4 million, for Boston, Houston, Los Angeles and San Diego.18 If we
recompute the predicted quantity sold in each price quartile under the assumption that there
was no boycott, and calculate total revenue, we obtain $8.6 million. Hence, our estimates imply
lost revenue of $1.2 million, for these four cities, which is equal to 16.1% of the observed revenue
for French wine over this six month period.
From March 2003 to August 2003, roughly the time of the boycott, the total value of wine
imported to the U.S. from France was equal to $695 million.19 If we extrapolate our revenue
calculation and assume this value would have been 16.1% higher had there been no boycott, then
the revenue loss for French wine importers to the U.S. market during this time was approximately
$112 million. Of course this is a crude back of the envelope calculation.
Our ﬁndings show that, despite the free-riding problem economic theory suggests would in-
18Actually, the exact prediction is $7,409,385. Note that the observed revenue is $7,409,541, which is remarkably
close, suggesting this is a reasonable approach.
19The exact ﬁgure is $694,822,551, and is deﬁned as the “landed duty-paid value” of wine imported from France
to the U.S. for the period March 2003 to August 2003, from the U.S. International Trade Commission.
20hibit participation, consumer boycotts can be an eﬀective approach for pressuring organizations
to change their behavior. John and Klein (2003) propose a number of possible psychological
explanations for why the free-riding problem may not stiﬂe boycott participation. For example,
individual consumers may have an exaggerated sense of their own eﬀectiveness, or individuals
may have a false sense of consensus. Suﬃce to say, empirical testing of alternative explanations
for boycott participation is beyond the scope of this paper.
Lastly, the results of this study also verify that ﬁrms’ foreign-earned proﬁts can be harmed by
their government’s foreign policy. Whether these kind of economic eﬀects are taken into account
by governments when setting foreign policy is a question for future research. Or put diﬀerently,
do economic incentives impose limits on the kinds of foreign policies that can be implemented?
For example, it has been suggested that governments may be unlikely to adopt foreign policies
that are critical of an important trading partner. Consistent with this view, our analysis sheds
light on one speciﬁc mechanism via which business proﬁtability depends on foreign policy.
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22Table 1: Market summary by origin of wine for sales in Boston, Houston, Los Angeles
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Revenue Quantity Mean Number of
Revenue ($) Share (%) Quantity Share (%) Price ($) Products
California 859,585,857 78.2 102,668,966 78.6 8.37 7,593
Italy 69,635,676 6.3 7,852,725 6.0 8.87 1,325
France 44,369,842 4.0 2,841,079 2.2 15.62 1,415
Australia 43,927,773 4.0 5,161,468 4.0 8.51 1,065
Washington 21,807,524 2.0 2,289,560 1.8 9.52 318
New York 17,468,967 1.6 4,301,908 3.3 4.06 205
Chile 12,364,580 1.1 1,781,645 1.4 6.94 523
Spain 10,953,638 1.0 1,174,432 0.9 9.33 317
Texas 5,678,569 0.5 822,676 0.6 6.90 133
Germany 2,366,678 0.2 394,296 0.3 6.00 144
Other 11,699,820 1.1 1,339,130 1.0 8.74 1,137
TOTAL 1,099,858,923 130,627,884 8.42 14,175
23Table 2: Overview of city characteristics
Boston Houston Los Angeles San Diego
Percent of total units
California 58 61 82 82
Italy 11 7 5 5
France 5 3 2 2
Australia 14 10 3 4
Total quantity 2,344,982 13,861,788 80,735,444 24,773,377
2002 population 5,309,000 4,713,500 15,752,400 2,837,500
Units per person 0.44 2.94 5.13 8.73
Vote for Bush in 2000 32% 57% 41% 50%
Vote for Gore in 2000 60% 40% 55% 46%
24Table 3: News coverage of French wine boycott
New York USA Wall Street Bill O’Reilly
Times Today Journal on Fox Total
Number of news items
All stories 13 6 3 24 46
Front page 6 3 0 NA 9
Correlation between news sources
New York Times 1
USA Today .08 1
Wall St Journal .41 .20 1
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 6: Boycott eﬀect for regions other than France
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Nonlinear Speciﬁcation
Coeﬃcient Std error ˆ θ Std error ˆ δ Std error 6-month eﬀect
France -.1213 0.0163 -.0238 0.0053 0.8595 0.0468 -13.3%
Australia 0.0380 0.0303 0.0285 0.0061 0.8254 0.0498 12.1%
California -.0428 0.0155 0.0119 0.0028 1.0089 0.0343 18.8%
Chile 0.0179 0.0386 0.0174 0.0041 0.9228 0.0389 13.4%
Italy 0.0213 0.0265 0.0025 0.0027 1.0066 0.1722 4.1%
Spain 0.0287 0.0386 -.0292 0.0036 1.0427 0.0033 -122.4%
All regressions are based on the full sample. For all estimates based on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation,
we also include wine-city ﬁxed eﬀects and week eﬀects. For all estimates based on the nonlinear speciﬁcation, we
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The market share of French wine in the top price quartile (price > $25.76) is divided by 10 to make a clear
ﬁgure. In fact, French wine dominates sales in the high price category.
37